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LEGAL EXPENSES AS DEDUCTIONS FROM INCOME
JOSEPH B. LYNCHt
IT IS readily understandable that an attorney who has been paid a fee,
or whose client has incurred legal expense upon his advice, should
charge himself with particular responsibility when consulted on the ques-
tion as to whether or not the item is a deductible expense. In such a
case, no one should have a better knowledge than the attorney of the
nature of the services, or .the facts surrounding the expense, and it would
seem that no one should be better qualified to answer an inquiry as to
how such fee or expense should be accounted for in the client's income
tax return. The question is disarmingly simple. So, too, are the applica-
ble provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Prior to the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1942, on& had merely to prove, to be entitled
to a deduction for legal expenses, that they were "ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business".- As a flood of litigation testifies, however, not only
has the simplicity of such general statutory language frequently made
difficult its specific application, but even the meaning of so simple a term
as "business" has been the subject of conflicting judicial opinion.
Occasional attempts have been made, generally without success, to
base a claim for a legal-expense deduction upon the statutory provision
permitting deductions for losses. In an early case,2 the Court dismissed
a secondary contention that attorneys' fees paid in defense of an account-
ing suit were deductible as losses incurred in trade or business, with the
remark: "We think it is obvious that the expenditure is not a loss".
This did not discourage another taxpayer, who later sought a deduction
for an attorney's fee paid in connection with a claim for the refund of
estate taxes, from suggesting that if the fee were not allowable as an
t Member of the New York Bar.
In this article the following abbreviated citations will be used: Acquiescence to a decision
of the Board of Tax Appeals by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will be cited as A.
Non-acquiescence will be cited as N.A. The Cumulative Bulletins of the Internal Revenue
Bureau will be cited as C.B. The Internal Revenue Bulletins will be cited as I.R.B.
The rulings of the Treasury Department (published in the Internal Revenue Bulletins) will
be cited as follows: General Counsel or Assistant General Counsel Memoranda will be
referred to as G.C.M. Rulings of the Income Tax Unit will be cited as I.T. The Solici-
tor's Law Opinions will be cited as L.O. The Opinions of the Attorney General of the
United States will be cited as Op. Atty. Gen. Office Decisions will be cited O.D. Treasury
Decisions will be cited as T.D. B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. refers to the docket number of the
memorandum opinions of the Board of Tax Appeals.
1. INT. REv. CODE, § 23 (a) (1), prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942.
2. Kornhauser v. U. S., 276 U. S. 145, 152 (1928).
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ordinary and necessary expense, it was deductible "as a loss in a trans-
action entered into for profit",' but the Court considered the point "too
far-fetched to require more than this indication that it has not been
overlooked." About the strangest place in the Code in which to seek a
basis for a legal-expense deduction is Sec. 23(e) (3), which allows de-
ductions for "casualty" losses, yet one taxpayer invoked, but without
success, the corresponding provision of a prior revenue act in claiming
a deduction for attorneys' fees paid to recover property from the Alien
Property Custodian 4 But however obvious the point may be, it seems
recently to have been either ignored or overlooked by the Board. In
John T. Furlong,- a participant in a dissolved syndicate contributed his
share of the cost of settlement of a tax claim against the syndicate, as
well as his share of the incidental attorneys' fees. The Board saw no
necessity for deciding whether the syndicate was a corporation or a
partnership. It held that the taxpayer, not being in business, was not en-
titled to an expense deduction, but, "upon authority of W. R. Hervey",'
allowed both amounts as losses in a transaction entered into for profit.
The Hervey case involved a syndicate transaction but did not relate to
attorneys' fees or other expenses. In the Furlong case, the taxpayer's
share of the attorneys' fees was small. Perhaps for this reason the
matter was not given adequate consideration, but at any rate the Board
seems to have nodded a bit, as did also the Bureau, which acquiesced,
for there can be little doubt that attorneys' fees are not deductible as
losses.
Therefore, with the exception of (1) items in the nature of capital
expenditures recoverable either over the life or on disposition of the
asset to which they relate, and (2) expenses in connection with borrow-
ings which must be spread over the term of the indebtedness,7 the sub-
ject of the deductibility of legal fees and expenses, to the extent that
it is based upon statutory provisions, narrows down to a consideration
of Sec. 23(a) (1) of the Code as it stood prior to the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1942, and of Sections 23(a) (1) (A) and 23(a) (2)
thereof, following such enactment.
3. Monell v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 631, 632 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
4. Alice P. Bachofen von Echt, 21 B. T. A. 702 (1930). See also, Walter S. Dickey,
14 B. T. A. 1295 (1929), wherein a taxpayer, sued for malicious prosecution by a person in
whose possession his stolen automobile was found, claimed the legal expense of defending
the action to be deductible either as a loss arising from theft or as a business expense.
The Board characterized the claim that the expense was a loss as "far fetched".
5. 45 B. T. A. 362 (1941), A. 1941-2 C. B. 5.
6. 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932), A. XI-2 C. B. 5 (1932).
7. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B. T. A. 1192 (1932); Emerson Electric Manu-
facturing Co., 3 B. T. A. 932 (1926).
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The first barrier, then, is the phrase "ordinary and necessary ex-
penses". The mental attitude with which the Board and the courts
approach the problem is reflected in the following quotation from a
recent Board opinion in a case involving a deduction for attorneys' fees
and other expenses:
"The cited cases are but a few of the legion in which the courts or this
Board have been called upon to determine the difficult and vexing question.
Collectively, they 'fail to provide "any verbal formula that will supply a ready
touchstone". Welch v. Helvering. . . " A. Giurlani & Bros. v. Commissioner,
supra. 'To attempt to harmonize (the cases) would be a futile task. They
involve the application of particular situations, at times with borderline con-
clusions.' Welch v. Helvering, supra. 'Review of the many decided cases is
of little aid since each turns on its own special facts.' Depitty v. du Pont,
supra. 'The words "ordinary and necessary" are not so clear and unambiguous
in their meaning and application as to leave no room for an interpretative regu-
lation.' Textile Mills Security Corporation v. Commissioner, supra."'
Of necessity, the phrase "ordinary and necessary expenses" has up to
this time been considered by the Board and the courts only in relation
to the other phrase "trade or business", which is the second and even
more difficult hurdle. Until the Code was amended by the Revenue Act
of 1942, it was essential to deductibility, in the case of all taxpayers,
corporate and noncorporate, that attorneys' fees be shown both to have
been "ordinary and necessary", and to have been paid or incurred "in
carrying on any trade or business".
In 1911, in the Stone Tracy case,' the first of the Corporation Tax
Cases arising out of the Federal excise tax law. of 1909, the Supreme
Court took occasion judicially to adopt as a definition of the term
"business":
"That which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for
the purpose of a livelihood or profit."
In 1917, in another case arising under the same law, the Court reiterated
and reaffirmed its original comprehensive definition.10 Accordingly, the
Commissioner, as well as the Board and the courts, for years interpreted
those provisions of the various income tax laws which allowed deduc-
tions for expenses in a trade or business in reliance upon the above
quoted broad definition, and a substantial body of law was built up on
this foundation.
8. Hales-Mullaly, Inc., 46 B. T. A. 25 (1942), aff'd. F. (2d) (C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
9. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 171 (1911).
10. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, 514-515 (1917).
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The first warning of the approaching storm appeared in 1940 when
Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced what the Circuit Court of Appeals"
later termed the "new spun" definition of the phrase "carrying on any
trade or business", and restricted it to "holding one's self out to others
as engaged in the selling of goods or services."'" The following year the
Supreme Court handed down two more decisions in which the Stone
Tracy definition was definitely rejected as a guide for the purposes of
Sec. 23(a) (1). 13
The reaction to these decisions came late in 1941 when, on the floor
of the Senate, the Revenue Bill of 1941 was amended to provide for
the deduction under Sec. 23(a)(1) of ordinary and necessary expenses
"in conserving and conducting the business affairs of the taxpayer". In
the Conference Report of September 15, 1941,14 the amendment was
stricken out, but only on the understanding of the conferees that the
point would be reconsidered in a later bill, and that the final determi-
nation by the Bureau "on issues arising under the Ligginsv. Srrth'5
decision.would be deferred pending such later legislation."' 6 Thus the
matter stood until March 3, 1942, when the Secretary of the Treasury
and his tax adviser, Randolph E. Paul, appeared before the Committee
on Ways and Means and offered suggestions as to the first revenue act
of the war. Mr. Paul thought that it would
"be equitable to provide for the deduction of expenses incurred in
the production of .. .nontrade or nonbusiness income",
and that subject to the statute of limitations, the provision be made
applicable to all prior years.'7 Whatever may be one's views as to other
recommendations of the Treasury Department, it will be freely conceded
that the foregoing was a most wholesome suggestion. It received a ready
response from the Congress and resulted in the enactment of Sec.
23 (a) (2). 8
ii. Helvering v. Highland, 124 F. (2d) 556, 561 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
12. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 499 (1940).
13. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212 (1941); U. S. v. Pyne, 313 U. S. 127 (1941).
14. 1941-2 C. B. 509.
15. This is undoubtedly an erroneous reference to Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212
(1941). Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940), merely involved a question of loss on a sale
of stock to a controlled corporation.
16. Amendment No. 41.
17. 1 Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942,
88.
18. "(2) Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses.-In the case of an individual, all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production
or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income."
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By the terms of the new provision, a non-corporate taxpayer is
afforded a further basis for the deduction of ordinary and necessary
expenses. 19 Where not connected with a trade or business, such ex-
penses may be deducted if paid or incurred during the taxable year
(1) for the production of income, (2) for the collection of income, (3)
for the management of property held for the production of income,
(4) for the conservation of such property, or (5) for the maintenance
of such property. By its terms, the Revenue Act of 1942 limits the
benefits of the new provision to expenses in "the case of an individual",
but since, by Sec. 162 of the Code, the income of an estate or trust,
with exceptions not here pertinent, is "computed in the same manner
and on the same basis as in the case of an individual", the new provision
applies in the case of all taxpayers other than corporations.
The amendment is made applicable to all taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1938. As the income tax provisions of the Code ap-
ply only to taxable years beginning after that date, the amendment is
thus made applicable to all years covered by the Code. Moreover, it is
made retroactively effective as if a part of the Revenue Act of 1938
(the income tax provisions of which applied only to taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 1937) and of all prior revenue acts.
Although the foregoing observations with respect to the difficulty of
specific application of such terms as "ordinary and necessary expenses"
and "trade or business", coupled with judicial differences of opinion as
to the meaning of "business" and the absence of administrative inter-
pretation of the newly enacted provision for deduction of certain non-
business expenses, 19' do not suggest encouraging results, nevertheless
the question of deduction for legal fees and expense is of such intimate
interest to attorneys as to warrant special study with a view to the possi-
bility of at least disclosing a number of signposts to guide the unwary
along an admittedly dim highway. It is not, however, intended to imply
that the treatment of attorneys' fees is any different from that of other
charges, professional or otherwise, which fall within the classification of
"ordinary and necessary expenses".
The scope of this paper does not include the subject of legal fees as
income to the recipient, nor does it enter the field of estate tax law.
It is limited to a consideration of some of the problems in relation to
19. Sec. 23 (a) (1) makes adequate provision for expense deductions of corporations.
Hence, as to them, no need existed for further relief.
19a. Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued T. D. 5196, approved December 8, 1942, which amends Regulations 103 and provides
for the allowance of non-trade and non-business deductions under the Revenue Act of 1942.
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the accounting for attorneys' fees and legal expenses as deductions
from income; but as questions of accounting for amounts paid in settle-
ment of litigation and of fines and penalties are frequently interwoven
with questions of accounting for attorneys' fees, these matters also are
made the subject of incidental discussion.
I.
Public Policy Decisions.
Attorneys' fees and legal expenses in several types of cases are dis-
allowed, not by reason of any specific statutory provision, but solely
on grounds of public policy. Before proceeding to a discussion of the
application of the Code provisions, it may be well to cover this field.
In the first category are attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred
in the unsuccessful defense of criminal prosecutions. In Sarah Backer,20
the earliest Board case on this subject, the public policy rule was set
forth as follows:
"We do not believe that it is in the interest of sound public policy that the
commission of illegal acts should be so far protected or recognized that their
cost is regarded as a legitimate and proper deduction in the computation of net
income under the revenue laws of the United States."
Similarly, the Circuit Court, having under consideration the deducti-
bility of fines, attorneys' fees and court costs incident to an indictment
charging participation in a price-fixing agreement to which the taxpayer
pleaded guilty, said:
"If the fines and costs cannot be deducted, the legal expenses incurred in
litigating the question whether the taxpayer violated the law and whether
fines should be imposed should naturally fall with the fines themselves ...
The disallowance may properly rest on a refusal to sanction expenditures of
such a character as we have here on grounds of public policy."21
The cases holding the expense of an unsuccessful defense against a
criminal charge to be nondeductible are uniform, and admit of no excep-
tion.22 A plea of nolo contendere to an indictment under the Sherman
20. 1 B. T. A. 214, 217 (1924).
21. Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 178, 180 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931).
22. Columbus Bread Company, 4 B. T. A. 1126 (1926), A. VI-1 C. B. 2 (1927), dis-
allowed attorneys' fees for services in matter of indictment for violation of state anti-trust
law, to which taxpayer pleaded guilty; B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930), A. X-1 C. B.
38 (1931), disallowed atorneys' fees paid in matter of violation of National Prohibition Law,
to which taxpayer pleaded guilty; Sanitary Earthenware Specialty Co., 19 B. T. A. 641
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Anti-Trust Act followed by the imposition of a fine is to be classified
as an unsuccessful defense, and the defendant's attorneys' fees are
accordingly not deductible.
No public policy, however, dictates that the expense of the successful
defense against a criminal charge should be disallowed. Thus, where a
corporation was indicted upon a charge of conspiracy to defraud the
United States, an alleged offense which arose directly out of its business,
and the Court quashed the indictment, the legal fees paid to defense
counsel were deductible. 4 Attorneys' fees incurred in successfully de-
fending a taxpayer against criminal charges involving fraud in a corpo-
rate tax return signed by him have also been allowed.2 It has even
been held that a person engaged in the horse-racing business who was
indicted for having heroin in his possession and administering it to race
horses might, upon dismissal of the indictment for lack of prosecution,
properly deduct his attorneys' fees and expenses.20
In the Backer case, in disallowing attorneys' fees incurred by the tax-
payer in his defense against a perjury charge, the Board said that it was
"wholly immaterial whether he was innocent or guilty." Although it
was in this case that the Board initially announced its public policy rule,
the case was actually decided, not on the public policy point, but on the
ground that the act whereby the taxpayer laid himself open to the
charge had no "proximate connection" with his business, and it was on
the latter point that the case was approvingly cited by the Supreme
Court.2 Other cases disallowing the deduction of legal expenses incurred
in successful defense against criminal charges have been based upon
the same grounds.28 These decisions, therefore, rest, not on public policy
(1930), disallowed expense of unsuccessful defense of charge of violation of Federal anti-
trust law; Estate of John W. Thompson, 21 B. T. A. 568 (1930), app. dism., 62 F. (2d) 1082
(C. C. A., 8th, 1932), disallowed expense of unsuccessful defense against U. S. action for
criminal conspiracy.
23. El Camino Refining Co., B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 106, 202, May 11, 1942.
24. Citron-Byer Co., 21 B. T. A. 308 (1930), N. A. X-2 C. B. 83 (1931).
25. Commissioner v. People's Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
But see Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 13 B. T. A. 1289 (1928), in which, without any specific
finding as to whether or not the defense was unsuccessful, attorneys' fees incurred in de-
fending a criminal proceeding for anti-trust law violations were disallowed. This case is
sound only if the record discloses an unsuccessful defense.
26. Hal Price Headley, 37 B. T. A. 738 (1938), A. 1938-2 C. B. 15.
27. Kornhauser v. U. S., 276 U. S. 145, 153 (1928).
28. George L. Rickard, 12 B. T. A. 836 (1928). See, also, John Stephens, 2 B. T. A.
724 (1925), wherein attorneys' fees incurred in defending the taxpayer against an indictment
charging conspiracy to defraud the United States were disallowed in the absence of evidence
showing the extent to which the alleged illegal acts of the taxpayer were connected with his
business. The taxpayer was exonerated from the charge.
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grounds-which are quite, independent of statutory provisions-but
rather on the ground of taxpayers' failure to meet a requirement of the
taxing act.
On the subject of legal expenses in criminal prosecutions, learned
authors in a monumental work on taxation have expressed the view:
"If the act necessitating the expenditure .is wholly tainted with criminality,
public policy prevails and the deduction is denied. On the other hand, if the
act does no great violence, tested by the mores of the day, the Court may,
sometimes by tortuous reasoning, emerge with a permission to deduct.129
In support, the authors referred for comparison to L. 0. 1092, 1-1 C. B.
270 and L. 0. 968, 2 C. B. 212, which related to losses in ultra vires
transactions, and also to the Backer case, wherein, it is true, the Board
made reference to acts mala in se, and from which reference the authors
drew the implication that "the rule may be different in regard to acts
mala prokibita." The writer has found no case which would tend to
support this opinion, and does not subscribe thereto.30
In a recent case,31 the Board had occasion to' pass upon the deducti-
bility of expenses, other than legal, of one engaged in gambling opera-
tions which "were illegal in New York by statutory prohibition". It
disposed of the taxpayer's argument that the expenses were deductible,
as follows:
"It is wholly immaterial here that the statutory offense involved is malum
prohibitum rather than malumr in se. Petitioner's argument in essence is that
his gambling operations were only 'a little bit' illegal because the penalty of
forfeiture of a bet received if a civil action is brought to recover the bet is
only a light penalty. The only merit of the argument is its humor. We must
proceed here with recognition that without any doubt betting, receiving, and
recording bets . . . and assisting anyone in doing the same, all were illegal
under New York statutes."
It would seem that, whether an act is malum in se or malum prohibi-
turn, the first test to be applied in determining whether attorneys' fees
in defense against criminal charges arising out of the act are deductible
is whether or not the taxpayer is guilty. If there is guilt, there can be
no deduction for the related legal expense. If there is no guilt, no public
policy requires that the attorneys' fees be disallowed, and the only
29. 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION (1934) § 23.44.
30. I.T. 1853, 11-2 C.B. 124 (1923), distinguishes between transactions which are mere
breaches of equitable duty and those "falling within the prohibition of positive enactment, a
maluin prohibitum".
31. Israel Silberman, 44 B.T.A. 600 (1941).
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question is whether there is a proximate relationship between the act
and the taxpayer's business, income or property.32
The same public policy which rules out attorneys' fees and legal ex-
penses in the unsuccessful defense of crime, but not in the successful
defense against a criminal indictment, likewise forbids the allowance
of attorneys' fees in the defense of a Government suit to restrain illegal
acts, such as anti-trust violations, if the defense is unsuccessful, but not
if the defense is successful. Moreover, in cases in which the suit is
brought by the Government and the defense is only partially successful,
an apportionment of the attorneys' fees is necessary to determine the
amount unallowable as a deduction on grounds of public policy. A brief
sketch of a line of Circuit Court decisions makes this point clear.
The first case33 involved an anti-trust suit. A notice of complaint had
been served by the Federal Trade Commission charging the company
with violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Attorneys were engaged
to represent the company, and after a hearing before the Commission
the complaint was dismissed. The company claimed as a deduction the
fees paid to its attorneys. There having been no violation of the law,
the Court saw no reason why the attorneys' fees should not be deducted. 4
The second case3 5 arose out of the disallowance by the Commissioner
of attorneys' fees in an equity proceeding instituted by the Attorney
General against a company which was alleged to have been engaged in
restraint of trade and commerce in violation of the Federal laws. The
litigation was terminated by a consent decree. It may be noted that
the violation consisted of membership in an association which was dis-
solved by the decree, and it does not appear that there was anything
which the Government sought which the decree did not contain. The
Court approved the disallowance of the deduction of the attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred in the litigation."
In the third case, Foss v. Commissioner,"7 the attorneys' fees were
32. For a study of the policy, its rationale and implications, see Comment (1941) 54
HARV. L. REv. 852.
33. Commissioner v. Continental Screen Co., 58 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
34. See also G.C.M. 19, 976, 1938-1 C.B. 120, wherein legal expense incurred in a success-
ful defense against an anti-trust suit brought by a state was allowed as a deduction.
35. Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), aff'g 26 B.T.A.
560 (1932).
36. In S.B. Heininger, 47 B.T.A. 95 (1942), the legal expenses were incurred in resisting
the Postmaster General's "fraud order" barring the use of the mails. In the District Court
the company had been successful in obtaining an injunction restraining the enforcement of
the "fraud order", but on appeal the Circuit Court reversed. The Board held that the legal
expenses were not deductible.
37. 75 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935).
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for services rendered in a suit brought by a minority shareholder charg-
ing that the taxpayer and others were not only in a combination to waste
the assets of the company, but were violating the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. The District Court had enjoined Foss and his associates from doing
the illegal acts specified, and also from voting their stock in the com-
pany. On appeal in the injunction suit, the Circuit Court vacated only
the part of the order relating to the voting of the stock, specifically
stating:
"In the present case nothing illegal has been done, and nothing illegal has
been threatened, although the complainants had reason to apprehend that
the defendant intended to do these things if he could."38
The Court saw no reason to disallow the attorneys' fees as a deduction.
In 1937 there came before the Second Circuit the twin cases of
National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering39 and General
Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. Helvering.4 Like the Foss case, these
related to anti-trust suits. Unlike the Foss case, each involved a suit
brought on behalf of the United States, rather than an individual, and
was terminated by a consent decree. In each, as in the Foss case, there
had been no finding that the company had committed the acts forbidden
by the decree. Nevertheless, the Court took the position that the decree
actually restrained the company from "what there was at least an appre-
ciable probability that it might do", and on this record disallowed the
deduction of the attorneys' fees insofar as they related to matters cov-
ered by the decree." By a concession which faintly suggests the pay-
ments to farmers under the Farm Parity Statute for what they fail to
produce, the Court allowed as deductions attorneys' charges for services
rendered in keeping restrictive provisions out of the decree, or, to quote
the Court, for services rendered in "resisting what the Attorney General
sought and the decree did not contain", and remanded the cases to the
Board. Pursuant to the Court's mandate, the Board weighed the prob-
lem and in each case emerged with findings that in each of the two years
under review two-thirds of the charges were deductible.42
38. Davidson v. American Blower Co., 243 Fed. 167, 170 (C. C. A: 2d, 1917).
39. 89 F. (2d) 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
40. 89 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
41. The Court was in evident disagreement with the decision of the First Circuit in the
Foss case, stating that it could not see any distinction "between the unsuccessful defense of a
suit by a minority shareholder to enjoin the unlawful conduct of the taxpayer and a suit
brought by the sovereign". But it will be noted that in the anti-trust suit under review
in the Foss case the Court had specifically found that nothing illegal had been done or
threatened.
42. General Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 66,511, June 24, 1938;
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Another group of decisions comprises those in which, by reason of
public policy, fines and penalties imposed in civil proceedings have been
disallowed as deductions. To this may now be added a decision that
moneys paid the Government by way of damages arising from a fraudu-
lent transaction perpetrated upon the Government are nondeductible.43
Originally, the Internal Revenue Bureau allowed deductions for penal-
ties imposed for negligence and delinquency;44 and at one time the Cir-
cuit Court weighed the idea of a distinction between penalties involving
moral obliquity and those due to innocent mistakes,45 but the law as
it developed drew no such distinction,46 and in the course of time the
Bureau withdrew its earlier ruling and held that all penalty payments,
* whether on account of negligence, delinquency or fraud were nondeducti-
ble.47 It has been only recently that an exception to the rule has ap-
peared. The Agricultural Adjustment Act provides for the imposition
of penalties upon producers who market certain crops in excess of
quotas. For example, as to one product, the Act48 provides for "a penalty
of one-quarter of 1 cent per pound on the excess so marketed". Con-
sonant with the statute, the Department of Agriculture Regulations also
provide in Section 703 for the payment of a "penalty" on the farm mar-
keting excess. Section 711 is captioned "Report of violations and court
proceedings to collect penalty". But Congress did not actually mean
National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkts. 65,252, 70,999, June
24, 1938.
43. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied
- Sup. Ct. - (1940): "The fact that the instant judgment was for damages arising out of
a tort against the Government, distinguishes it from cases where the damages arise out
of a tort against an individual."
44. L.O. 926, 1 C.B. 241 (1919).
45. Burroughs Building Material Company v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931).
46. Great Northern Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 40 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U. S. 855 (1930), involving penalties for violation of FEDERAL SAErY
APPLIANCES ACT, HOURS OF SERVICE ACT, LivE STOCK ACT and customs regulations; Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931), involving penalties for violations of FEDERAL SAFETY
APPLIANCES ACT, HOURS OF SERVICE ACT, LIVE STOCr LAW, the QuRAXTIXE LAW, etc.; Ter-
minal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U. S. 604 (1933), involving penalties for violations of Safety Appliances Act and
Live Stock Act; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 22 B.T.A. 949, 963 (1931) rev'd on other
issues, 75 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), involving fine for violation of Federal statutes;
Bonnie Bros., Inc., 15 B.T.A. 1231 (1929), involving fine for violation of Federal laws regu-
lating interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors.
47. G.C.M. 11,358, XII-1 C.B. 29 (1933).
48. 52 STAT. 62 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A., § 1356.
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what it said when it imposed a "penalty", nor did the Department of
Agriculture when it expressly provided for a report of -"violations" and
for proceedings to collect the "penalty", for the Internal Revenue Bu-
reau has ruled49 that these are only "so-called penalties" and are imposed,
not for "violation" of the statute, but rather for the purpose of "legal-
izing" the marketing of production in excess of the quota. On the basis
of this tenuous distinction, the Bureau has held that such penalties are
allowable as deductions from income. Accordingly, the well established
principle that penalties are not deductible must now be refined to exclude
nonpunitive money penalties. The farmers seem to have been made the
beneficiaries of a somewhat liberal interpretation.
In view of the settled state of the law with respect to fines and penal-
ties, what is to be said of legal expenses incurred in unsuccessfully re-
sisting them? No decision has been found which adequately deals with
the question of deductibility of legal expenses in civil proceedings
brought to collect such fines and penalties, although numerous decisions
deny deductions for legal expenses in the unsuccessful defense against
criminal indictments resulting in fines,5" and in one case the Board,5'
analogizing between nondeductible fines for unlawful acts and related
legal expenses, cited Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St.. Louis,52 which involved
civil penalties only.
The soundness of the decisions which disallow as deductions fines and
penalties, whether imposed for innocent mistakes or for serious infrac-
tions, is not questioned. A fine or a money penalty is a form of punish-
ment, and public policy demands that the offender bear the full brunt
of it. To allow an income tax deduction for a fine would place the
Government in the anomalous position of itself bearing a portion of the
burden. But this is not so as to the incidental legal expenses. Does public
policy in all cases require that since fines are disallowed, legal expenses
in litigating the question of liability therefor should also be disallowed?
If one abandon the role of idealist, and realistically approach the problem
of squaring the complexities of the conduct of present day industrial
business with the countless technical provisions of existing regulatory
laws, each with its concomitant fine or penalty, one is less inclined to
insist upon that brand of logic which demands that since a fine is non-
deductible, legal expenses incident to the determination of liability there-
49. I.T. 3530, I.R.B. No. 7, p. 2 (1942).
50. See Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931), and cases cited supra footnote 22.
51. B. E. Levinstein, 19 B.T.A. 99, 104 (1930).
52. 17 B.T.A. 1135 (1929).
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for must likewise be disallowed, and which further demands that until
the question of liability for the fine is determined, the question of de-
ductibility of the legal expenses must remain in abeyance.
In any event, there would seem to be room, both in a civil proceeding
for fines or penalties and in a criminal prosecution, for the application
of the allocation theory adopted by the Court in the civil anti-trust pro-
ceeding in the National Outdoor Advertising case. For example, the
current, and apparently effective, procedure of the Department of Justice
in enforcing the anti-trust laws is to commence with a criminal proceed-
ing, and seek an indictment with a number of counts. Frequently, after
the parties have concluded their negotiations, the complaint in the civil
proceeding is drawn virtually to reflect their agreement, and the consent
decree follows. Just as in a civil anti-trust proceeding the court has
deemed it proper to allocate legal expenses so as to permit deduction of
the part incurred in keeping out of the consent decree what the Govern-
ment originally endeavored to include, so it would seem equally proper,
if a criminal proceeding is resorted to with an indictment containing
many counts, to allocate legal expenses so as to allow as a deduction
such as relate to counts ultimately quashed or abandoned, and to dis-
allow such as are allocable to counts with respect to which a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere is entered and to matters as to which a consent
decree grants an injunction.
In civil suits on account of private actionable wrong, no public policy
is involved in the allowance of attorneys' fees in defense, and no dis-
tinction is drawn between successful and unsuccessful defenses. In a
frequently cited case,3 the Circuit Court, after making reference to a
Department ruling,54 a Board decision,55 and a leading Supreme Court
decision,5" observed:
"In none of these rulings is it suggested that if the defendant in a civil suit
charging medical malpractice, or tortiously wounding a person, or infringing a
patent, is unsuccessful, the private wrong-doing so adjudged infects the pay-
ment for its defense."
On the contrary, the Court recognized a distinction
"between the defense of offenses against the government, of which governmental
53. Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), allowing as an expense,
amounts paid in satisfaction of a judgment resulting from a fraudulent transaction. For lack
of a proper record the Commissioner's appeal from the Board decision allowing as a deduc-
tion attorneys' fees in. defending the suit was not considered.
54. S.M. 4078, V-1 C.B. 226 (1926).
55. F. Meyer & Brother Co., 4 B.T.A. 481 (1926).
56. Kornhauser v. U.S., 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
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policy prohibits consideration as ordinary incidents of a business, and defend-
ing private wrong-doing in the course of business, the cost of which is ruled
deductible",
and concluded:
"We cannot agree that private wrong-doing in the course of business is
extraordinary within the meaning of the taxing statute allowing deductions
for 'ordinary and necessary expenses'."
The Board applied the foregoing principles in a case5 7 in which a corpo-
rate taxpayer and its officers and directors compromised a suit charging
that they had unlawfully conspired to restrain and interfere with the
plaintiff's business, and allowed as an expense both attorneys' fees in
the suit and the amount paid in settlement.58
In the absence of supporting judicial authority, one may be permitted
to differ with Mr. Mertens' suggestion that,
"if the action incorporates a charge of fraudulent action of the corporation
and its officers and the allegations are sustained, the expenses incurred in the
defense would probably not be deductible", 59
although it may be conceded that if the act which occasioned the legal
expense were a crime, admitted or proved, the same rule would apply
with respect to the deductibility of the legal expenses as in the case of
a criminal prosecution.
The deductibility of attorneys' fees paid in connection with attempts
to further or defeat legislation is now definitely proscribed. Although
no statutory provision prohibits their deduction, long-standing Treasury
Regulations provide that sums
"expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, the
exploitation of propaganda . . . are not deductible from gross income." 60
57. International Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938); A. 1938-2 C.B. 17.
58. See also, Becker Bros. v. U.S., 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), holding deduction of
loss incurred on payment of a judgment resulting from infringement of a patent was not to
be denied on grounds of public policy; Central Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 922 (App.
D. C., 1930), allowing a deduction for an amount paid to compromise a decree in an action
based upon fraud; Matson Navigation Company, 24 B.T.A. 14 (1931), allowing as a deduc-
tion share of legal expense in successful defense of a fraud suit; I.T. 1853, 11-2 C.B. 124
(1923), allowing as a deduction an amount paid to compromise a judgment in an action for
breach of fiduciary duty; O.D. 1091, 5 C.B. 139 (1921), allowing as a deduction an amount
paid to compromise a suit against a former director for alleged dereliction of duty.
59. 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAxArioN (1942), § 25.37, n. 12.
60. Reg. 103, Sections 19.23 (o-1) and 19.23 (q-1). See also, T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec.
Int. Rev., pp. 48, 57-58, and similar regulations under subsequent Acts.
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Paul and Mertens6 have expressed their views as follows:
"A generalization may be made that lobbying expenses are not deductible.
But the term 'lobbying' ishere used in an objectionable sense and taxpayers
are, under many circumstances, legitimately entitled to be represented before
legislatures. Where fees are paid for this legitimate type of representation,
they may be deducted as an expense of the business."
They cite as authority a case12 in which the Fifth Circuitfound that
the taxpayer had employed an attorney who appeared before "various
committees of the Legislature, explained and advocated the passage of
the bill'which he had drawn". The bill was enacted. In what seems a
non sequitur, the Court concluded that the attorney was not employed
"to secure the passage or defeat of any legislation". The Ninth Circuit,
however, was more strict in its application of these Regulations, and
held that they were to be applied in all cases where the activities in
respect of which the expenditures were made might reasonably be said
to fall within their terms. 3 Subsequently, a case came before the Board 4
in which the question was the deductibility of attorneys' fees for services
in an eff9rt to procure the enactment of Federal legislation. The Board
felt that "obligatory application of the regulation would result in mis-
application of the statute in the instant case", and with due respect to
the Ninth Circuit declined to follow its decision. But the Circuit Court
reversed6" and was upheld.66 The Supreme Court deemed it immaterial
whether or not the arrangement was to spread "insidious influences
through legislative halls", and, placing its imprimatur on the Treasury
Regulation, determined that the "general policy being clear it is not for
us to say that the line was too strictly drawn."
Accordingly, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate types
of legislative representation is no longer recognized, and the conclusion
would seem to be inevitable that, however free from taint an effort to
influence legislation may be, attorneys' fees incurred for services in this
connection run afoul of the Treasury Regulations, and may not be de-
ducted from income. The Court's ultimate decision was based upon the
phraseology of the Treasury Regulations. No reason is apparent why
they could not and should not be amended.
61. 3 LAW or FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATX o (1934), § 23.47.
62. Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F. (2d) 1027 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
63. Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
64. Textile Mills Securities Corporation, 38 B.T.A. 623 (1938).
65. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corporation, 117 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940).
66. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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i.
Period of Deductibility.
As the Code"7 limits deductions for expenses to the taxable year in
which "paid or incurred" or "paid or accrued", dependent upon the
taxpayer's accounting method, it is fundamental that attorneys' fees
may be deducted only in the year in which paid by a taxpayer whose
income is computed on a cash basis of accounting, and only in the year
in which accrued by a taxpayer on an accrual basis."' The first part
of the rule requires no comment.
Before developing the subject of the accrual of legal expenses, it may
be well briefly to discuss-because it is a law unto itself-the matter
of accrual of expenses occasioned by the death of a taxpayer. In those
sections of the Code, 9 prior to the 1942 amendments, Which related
to amounts of income and expenses "accrued" up to the date of death
of a taxpayer, and in those sections, subsequent to the 1942 amend-
ments, which relate to such amounts "accrued" only by reason of the
death of the taxpayer, the term "accrued" has a peculiar connotation,
different from its meaning as employed in other provisions of the Code.
The theory of accrual adopted in these particular secti6ns, wholly alien
to the normal concept, cannot elsewhere be applied. As the Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Enrigt 70 had held that in the return to date of
death of a deceased member of a law partnership (both the member and
the partnership keeping accounts on a cash basis of accounting) there
should be included as income his share of any profits earned, but not
received, to that date, to the extent that they were capable of approxi-
mate valuation, the Board, in a logical application of the theory, allowed
as a deduction in the return to the date of death of the late Lewis C.
Ledyard, Jr.," who had also been on a cash basis of accounting, an
amount paid more than a year after his death, pursuant to a judgment
rendered more than a year after his death in a suit in which liability
was predicated upon his conduct more than three years prior to his
death; and also allowed as a deduction for such period legal expenses
for services rendered in such litigation.
The Third Circuit thought that the Enright case by implication dis-
67. INT. REv. CODE, §§ 23 (a) and 43.
68. O.D. 3, 1 C.B. 109 (1919).
69. INT. REV. CODE, §§ 42 and 43.
70. 312 U.S. 636 (1941) ; see also, Pfaff v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 646 (1941).
71. Lewis C. Ledyard, Jr., 44 B.T.A. 1056 (1941).
1943]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
posed of "such general criticisms of § 42 as that it is unreasonable",7"
but, happily, the Treasury Department,7" the House Committee on Ways
and Means7 and the Senate Committee on Finance 75 were of a different
mind, and agreed that Sec. 42 worked a "hardship". Hence, Congress
has provided that income and expenses accrued only by reason of the
death of a taxpayer shall no longer be included in the return of a dece-
dent to the date of death.76 Even under the amended statute, however,
such expenses are given special treatment, being deductible by the dece-
dent's estate or by the recipients of the decedent's property "in the
taxable year when paid".77 If the newly enacted provision were applied
to the facts in the Ledyard case-it may be thus retroactively applied
at taxpayer's option 78-- the judgment and legal expenses there involved
would be deductible only in the year of payment. This would also have
been the result if the decedent had been on an accrual basis. Hence, in
the case of an estate actually following the accrual method of account-
ing, the amended statute has the paradoxical effect of allowing a deduc-
tion for certain legal expenses only in the year of payment.
The general rule is that, on an accrual basis, attorneys' fees are de-
ductible only in the year in which the fees are determined in amount,
and that the period during which the services are rendered is not a
factor. Attempts to breach this line have met with failure. On occasion,
taxpayers have sought to anticipate the fees of counsel, and have taken
a deduction for an estimated amount of fees and legal expense." They
have also attacked in another direction and sought, after determination
of the fee, to allocate a portion of it to a prior year. 0 But the rule is
clear that the mere fact that services have been performed does not
72. Bach v. Rothensies, 124 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. denied, 62 S. Ct. 1035
(1942).
73. Statement of Randolph E. Paul, 1 Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means
on Revenue Revision of 1942, 89.
74. I.R.B., No. 43, p. 56 (1942).
75. I.R.B., No. 44, p. 93 (1942).
76. Revenue Act of 1942, § 134 (a) and (b).
77. INT. REV. CODE, § 126 (b) (1).
78. Revenue Act of 1942, § 134 (g).
79. New Process Cork Co., 3 B.T.A. 1339 (1926); Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. U.S.,
4 Fed. Supp. 525 (1933), aff'd 73 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
80. Oswald and Hess Company, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 105,203, Jan. 5, 1942, aff'd
130 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). In Searles Real Estate Trust, 25 B.T.A. 1115 (1932), A.
XI-1 C.B. 6, a deduction was allowed to taxpayer on an accrual basis for legal fees not paid
until a succeeding year "because there was no available money." The report does not state
the year in which the bills were rendered, but the evidence discloses that the amounts had
been agreed upon in the years for which the deduction was allowed.
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establish an accrual. The underlying theory is that the determining
event is the attorney's decision, communicated to his client, as to the
amount of his fee, and the creation thereby of his client's obligation,
admitted or enforcible, to make payment. Until the happening of that
event, there has been no determination, and, therefore, no accrual. Nor
when it does occur can it be related back to a prior year merely because
all or part of the services were rendered in that year. If an on-account
charge is made by an attorney, whether for services rendered or to be
rendered over an indefinite period, the date of accrual would seem to be
the date of determination of the fee, if the client's liability therefor is
then enforcible or undisputed. But where, either in or prior to the
taxable year, a definite retainer is agreed upon, and the period covered
by the services definitely established, the fee would seem to be an ac-
crued liability for the period in which the services are to be rendered,
apportionable if it covers more than one taxable year.
One case8 in which the opinion of the Court does not square with
the foregoing view may be noted. There, attorneys' fees paid in the
taxable year in connection with a sale of property were claimed as a
deduction in that year, although the sale was not consummated until
January 2nd of the succeeding year. In allowing the deduction, the
Court expressed the thought that the fact that the sale was not completed
within the year
"in no wise militates against the view that the services rendered
and for which the fee was paid, may lawfully be allocated"
to the prior year. The decision itself is sound, but as much cannot be
said for the reasoning. Whether the taxpayer was on a cash or an accrual
basis of accounting does not appear. If on a cash basis, the fee was a
deduction in the taxable year, because paid in that year; if on an accrual
basis, it was also a deduction in the taxable year, because it appears
that the amount was agreed upon and by payment recognized as a
liability in that year. But the Court seems to have strayed somewhat
in resting its conclusion upon the circumstance that the services rendered
might "lawfully be allocated" to the year under review.
In the case of contingent fee arrangements, the deduction is normally
accruable only in the year in which the contingency occurs. This rule,
however, is subject to the modification that if in a particular year a
claim is made against a taxpayer which, if definitely established, would
be deductible, and in the same year he agrees, if the defense is successful,




to pay counsel a fee based upon a percentage of the claim, his liability
in the amount agreed upon is fixed in that year, and he is, therefore, en-
titled to a deduction in such year. In one such case,82 a corporate tax-
payer following the accrual method engaged counsel in 1935 to contest
the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and agreed to
pay a fixed percentage of the 1935 taxes which might be saved. The
Supreme Court decision invalidating the Act was handed down on Janu-
ary 6, 1936.8' In allowing the attorneys' fees as a 1935 deduction, the
Board correctly pointed out that, to the amount of the fees agreed
upon, the taxpayer's economic status was definitely fixed in 1935, as
he was obligated to pay that amount either in taxes or in counsel fees.8
In the foregoing case the Board sought to buttress its position with
another point which it is appropriate to note here. Quoting from San-
ford Cotton Mills, Inc., 5 the Board said:
... an accrual of either income or outgo which is clearly in doubt
may, and often should, be adjusted when shortly thereafter in the
next year the doubt is removed."
This doctrine is probably bottomed on that portion of Section 43 of the
Code which provides for inclusion of deductions in the taxable year in
which paid or accrued "unless in order to clearly reflect the income the
deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period." Although
it has been said to be an administrative necessity, this provision is actu-
ally a taxpayer's "No Man's Land". Seldom applied, it is none the less
a potential breeder of uncertainty. A taxpayer might well be tempted
to paraphrase the Board:
When an accrual of income or outgo is clearly in doubt, and shortly after
the end of the taxable year the doubt is removed, the taxpayer will then be
clearly in doubt as to the year of accrual, and if the Commissioner is also in
doubt recourse must be had to the Board and the courts where the doubts
will be removed.
The Bureau's appraisal of the Board's opinion is reflected in a Memo-
randum 6 wherein the Chief Counsel stated that the decision should be
accepted as to the result, but recommended nonacquiescence on the
ground that it was
82. The Tobin Packing Co., Inc., 43 B.T.A. 642 (1941).
83. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
84. To the same effect are Blaine, Mackay, Lee Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 101,887,
Jan. 17, 1942, and Blaine, Mackay, Lee Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 103,846, Jan. 17, 1942.
85. 42 B.T.A. 190 (1940), N.A. 1940-2 C.B. 14.
86. G.C.M. 22, 404, 1940-2 C.B. 204.
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('a departure from the strict rule that a contingent liability, which is depend-
ent on the last day of the accounting period upon a future event, is not a
deductible accrued liability for such accounting period".
If an officer and a member of the board of directors of a corporation
which is on an accrual basis renders legal services to it, prepares a bill
dated December 30th of one year, and in the succeeding year presents
it to another corporate officer who causes it to be paid on January 8th
of that year, is the corporation entitled to a deduction in the first or
the second year? 'This question recently came before the Board.8 In
what might be considered a miracle of understatement, the Board, in
allocating the deduction to the second year, said that it might
f'seem unrealistic to admit that a man possesses knowledge in one capacity
while he is totally ignorant of it in another (but), we face an anomalous
situation here; and we conclude that the corporation first learned of the
lawyer's charge when the bill was presented to a corporate officer other than
(the lawyer who rendered the bill)."
As to the period in which deductions are allowable for accrual of legal
fees, the following conclusions appear to be warranted:
(1) Except as to items which accrue by reason of the death of
the taxpayer now deductible only in the year in which paid, legal
fees may be deducted only in the year in which the amount thereof
is definitely determined, such determination being generally within
the control of the attorney rendering the services.
(2) Legal fees payable pursuant to a retainer covering a definite
period are deductible in the period to which the retainer relates.
(3) If liability for a fee is contingent, it is deductible only up6n
the happening of the contingency; but this does not preclude an
earlier deduction where the taxpayer is alternatively liable in an
ascertainable amount, either for an asserted claim which, if definite-
ly established, would itself constitute a deductible item, or for a
fee for legal services in resisting such asserted liability.
III.
Legal Expenses Not Solely for Taxpayer's Benefit.
It has long since been said, and often repeated,"8 that there must be
87. Motion Picture Corporation of California, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 104,651, February
17, 1942.
88. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924); Kornhauser v. U.S., 276 U.S. 145 (1928) ; Stone's
Estate v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Anderson v. Commissioner, 81
F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 10th, i936).
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a proximate relationship between the matter out of which the legal ex-
penses arise and the business of the taxpayer. As to corporate taxpayers,
this is still the law. As to non-corporate taxpayers, it is essential that
such relationship be established if the deduction is sought as a business
expense; if claimed as a non-business expense, a proximate relationship
must be shown between the subject matter of the expense and the pro-
duction or collection of taxpayer's income or the maintenance, con-
servation or management of his property held for the production of
income.
No attempt will be made to enumerate the countless factual situations
in which the Board and the courts have had occasion to apply the "proxi-
mate relationship" test where only the taxpayer was benefited by such
expenditures. It is, however, possible, within the scope of this paper,
to select and focus attention upon cases in which the subject matter of
the expense was not solely an asset of, or an asserted liability against,
the taxpayer, and in which, therefore, the amount expended also bene-
fited someone other than the taxpayer. Typical are instances involving
the deductibility by a corporation of the cost of settlement of and legal
expenses incurred in litigation involving officers, directors and stock-
holders. Witness the motley array of cases on this point:
(1) Amounts paid for legal services in representing the taxpayer's
officers and principal stockholders in unexplained litigation against them,
but not against the taxpayer, have been disallowed.89
(2) Amounts paid in settlement of litigation predicated upon a
charge of conspiracy made against persons who were directors and large
stockholders of the taxpayer, the latter being neither a party to the
conspiracy nor a defendant in the suit, have been disallowed. ° The
Board in this case was unconvinced by a resolution of the Board of
Directors reciting that the directors had acted for and on behalf of the
corporation, since nearly all the defendants were themselves directors.
But the Circuit Court referred to the "alleged acts" as having been
"committed by the defendants as officers and directors".
(3) Amounts paid for attorneys' fees and legal expenses, and in
settlement of a suit which charged certain individuals with conspiracy
and alleged that the taxpayer had been organized in furtherance of the
conspiracy and in which the taxpayer was a defendant, although not
89. Evans-Winter-Hebb, Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 106,780, July 21, 1942.
90. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 20 B.T.A. 661 (1930); aff'd 60 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 10th,
1932).
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charged with conspiracy, have been disallowed.9 In this case, the Board
took occasion to say:
"No case has been cited, and we know of none, in which deduction has been
allowed for the full amount of a fee paid by one defendant for the benefit
of several, and the general rule, certainly in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, would seem to be that deduction should be allowed only for the
aliquot portion of the total fee."
(4) Legal expenses and an amount paid by the taxpayer to settle
a judgment against its president, resulting from injuries caused by him
while driving an automobile owned by the taxpayer, have, in the absence
of evidence as to the officer's mission at the time of the accident, been
disallowed. 2
(5) Attorneys' charges and other expenses incurred by a corpora-
tion in adjusting personal disagreements in the family of its president
and principal stqckholder, even though these activities "if continued,
would probably have resulted in the ruin of the corporation's business",
have been disallowed.93
(6) Amounts paid for attorneys' fees in a successful defense of the
taxpayer and two of its officers against an indictment based upon acts
growing out of taxpayer's business have been allowed, and without
apportionment.94
(7) An amount paid as attorneys' fees and in settlement of a suit
against the taxpayer and certain of its officers and directors charging
conspiracy and other unlawful acts has been allowed, and without
apportionment.9 5
Before drawing conclusions, two more cases, involving payments by
individuals, may be cited:
(a) Attorneys' fees paid by an individual taxpayer in a suit charging
the taxpayer and others with misrepresentation and conspiracy in the
conduct of the business of a corporation, and payment made by the tax-
payer in settlement of the litigation, were held deductible in full, al-
91. Hales-Mullaly, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 25 (1942), aff'd - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 10th,
1942).
92. San-Knit-Ary Textile Mills, Inc., 22 B.T.A. 754 (1931).
93. Forty-Four Cigar Co., 2 B.T.A. 11,56 (1925) ; see also, White v. Commissioner, 61 F.
(2d) 726 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), holding that where a partnership paid an amount in settle-
ment of a claim against a partner arising out of a prepartnership transaction, the payment
being for the reason that the claim so harassed the partner "that he was unable properly to
attend to and assist in carrying on the partnership business", the expense did not have such a
relationship to the business of the corporation as to permit a deduction.
94. Citron-Byer Co., 21 B.T.A. 308 (1931), N.A. X-2 C.B. 83 (1931).
95. International Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938); A. 1938-2 C.B. 17.
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though the taxpayer bore the entire burden of the expense and settle-
ment. 6 In this case, the Board took occasion to observe:
"Though the Kornhauser case involved only legal fees, we believe the rea-
soning employed applies equally to the compromise payment made to settle
the lawsuit. This expense grew directly out of, and proximately resulted from,
the business dealings between the parties .... Nor do we believe it important
that petitioner, in his individual capacity, paid the entire sum though other
persons were named as parties defendant. Petitioner was the real party in
interest, the one who stood to suffer most. See E. L. Potter, 20 B. T. A. 252;
and Edward A. Pierce, 18 B. T. A. 447."
(b) Attorneys' fees paid by an individual taxpayer is resisting an
action in which he was not a defendant, one of the results of which
would have been substantially to affect his business interests by ousting
him from control of a corporation, were held deductibleY
The cases present two questions, (1) whether the expenses are de-
ductible at all, and (2) if so, whether apportionment is necessary. In
the first five cases, the deduction was disallowed because the taxpayer
failed to meet the "proximate relationship" test. In the first case, the
nature of the litigation which was the subject of the fees did not appear;
in the second, the Board apparently treated the acts of the alleged con-
spirators as not in pursuance of the business of the corporation; in the
third, the acts which were the basis of the conspiracy charge antedated
the organization of the corporation; in the fourth, there was no proof
that the president of the corporation was using the automobile in the
corporation's business, and in the fifth,, the disagreements were largely
personal and family matters. The sixth and seventh cases in which the
deductions were allowed without apportionment, and the two individual
cases, in one of which the deduction was allowed without apportionment
and in the other of which the deduction was allowed in full even though
the taxpayer was not a defendant, are sound. The dictum in the third
case suggesting the necessity of apportionment is answered by the deci-
sions in the sixth and seventh cases, and the quotation from the first
individual case.
Frequently quoted authors, writing in 1934, said:
"The cost of the defense of directors is not deductible by a corpo-
rate taxpayer",98
96. H. M. Howard, 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931) ; N.A. X-2 C.B. 90 (1931).
97. E. L. Potter, 20 B.T.A. 252 (1930) ; N.A. X-1 C.B. 90 (1931).
98. 3-PAUL and MERTENS, LAw or FEDERAL INCOmE TAxAaioN, § 23.49.
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citing the Blackwell Oil decision. 9 One of the same authors, writing in
1942, concluded:
"That part of the cost of defending the action includes defense
of officers and directors does not necessarily make such expendi-
tures non-deductible", 100
citing the International Shoe decision.' 0 ' The latter is perhaps another
way of saying that a corporation may be entitled to a deduction for all,
and not merely an aliquot part, of the l6gal expense incurred in defend-
ing its'elf, and, incidentally, its co-defendant officers and directors. In-
deed, the right of a corporation to deduct legal expenses in defending
its officers and directors would seem to lie even deeper, as their defense
may itself be a duty of the corporation if the acts complained of were
done in the course of the corporation's business.
It may therefore be concluded that if litigation involving a corpora-
tion, its officers, directors or stockholders, relates to the business of the
corporation, legal expenses and amounts paid in settlement are fully
deductible, and there is no necessity for apportioning the cost among
the defendants. If the corporation is the real party in interest, and
incurs the expense, it is entitled to the deduction, although others may
also benefit.' s
The same rule would seem to be applicable if two related corporations,
for example, parent and subsidiary, were sued, and the parent, standing
to lose the most by an unfavorable result, bore the entire expense for
legal services rendered to it, although such services incidentally bene-
fited the subsidiary.3°  To the extent that the services were rendered
to the subsidiary, the charge would obviously not be a deduction to the
parent, but to the extent that the services were rendered to the parent
for its benefit, and incidentally the same services also benefited the sub-
sidiary, the legal fee should be a deduction to the parent, and there is
neither reason nor authority for requiring apportionment. Such a situ-
99. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 20 B.T.A. 661 (1930), aff'd 60 F. (2d) 257 (1932).
100. 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (1942), § 25.37.
101. International Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938).
102. Matson Navigation Co., 24 B.T.A. 14 (1931), is not to the contrary. The taxpayer,
one of several stockholders, was allowed as a deduction only a pro rata share of attorneys'
fees and court costs of a lawsuit, but that was all it paid and claimed as a deduction.
103. Cf. Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A, 2d, 1942), where a trustee
incurred legal expenses concerning a beneficiary's assignment of her interest, and the question
of assignability was of equal interest to the trustee. In determining the distributable income
to the beneficiary, the legal fees were held not chargeable to the beneficiary. Whether the
legal fees were a deduction to the trustee was not an issue.
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ation is 'clearly to be distinguished from a case in which deduction is
disallowed because a payment did not directly benefit the corporate tax-
payer, but benefited it only indirectly as a stockholder." 4 Experience
proves that the Internal Revenue Bureau looks askance at trans-
actions within a related group, and therefore might not subscribe to
the views herein expressed, except, perhaps, in such a case as one in
which the subsidiary was financially irresponsible. The sound rule, how-
ever, would seem to be that if an amount of legal expenses were incurred
by a parent corporation which would have been deductible by it were
it the sole defendant, its right to the deduction of the full amount
should not be diminished by reason of the circumstance that a related
corporation, also a defendant, was thereby benefited.
If a corporation lawfully pays legal expenses in connection with a
stockholders' derivative suit against its officers and directors, based upon
their conduct of the affairs of the corporation, the fact that the officers
or directors derived a benefit from such payment is no valid reason for
denial to the corporation of a deduction for the full amount paid.'
Cases involving distributees of liquidated corporations present another
situation wherein the liability constituting the basis of the expense is not
solely that of the taxpayer. If a tax claim arises against a corporation
after its liquidation and the stockholders incur legal expense in resisting
the claim, the cases hold that such expense is deductible if the tax would
have been a charge against the business assets of the stockholders,"0 6 or
if the stockholders as transferees would have been personally liable
therefor.10
7
In a case in which the taxpayer was the record owner of less than
three-fourths of the stock of a liquidated corporation and bore three-
104. Daily Journal Co., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 105,054, May 11, 1942.
105. See N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW, § 61 (a), as amended by C. 350, Laws of 1941.
106. Joshua C. Kelley, 38 B.T.A. 1292 (1938), A. 1939-1 C.B. (Part I) 19; Fred T. Ley,
21 B.T.A. 216 (1930), N.A. X-1 C.B. 85 (1931); John R. Sproehnle, 20 B.T.A. 417 (1930),
N.A. X-1 C.B. 93 (1931), app. dism. C. C. A. 7th, June 19, 1931; Flemmon E. Gloyd, 19
B.T.A. 966 (1930), A. IX-2 C.B. 22 (1930), aff'd on another issue, 63 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A.
8th, 1933) ; H. E. Bullock, 16 B.T.A. 451 (1929), N.A. VIII-2 C.B. 60 (1929).
107. Benjamin P. O'Neal, 18 B.T.A. 1036 (1930), A. IX-2 C.B. 45 (1930); cf. Sigmund
Spitzer, 23 B.T.A. 776 (1931) (taxpayer's appeal dismissed, C. C. A. 3d, Jan. 29, 1934). A
decision allowing legal expense merely on this ground cannot stand the test of Deputy v.
du Pont, but under the amended law permitting deduction of nonbusiness expenses it may be
possible for a stockholder to deduct such legal expense under such circumstances. As already
noted, in John T. Furlong, 45 B.T.A. 362 (1942), a participant 'in a dissolved syndicate from
which he had received profits was denied as a business expense (but allowed as a loss) the
amount of legal fees incurred in the settlement of a tax claim against the syndicate. Under
the amended statute, the decision would clearly have been in the taxpayer's favor.
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fourths of the legal expense of resisting a tax claim against the corpo-
ration, the expense so incurred was allowed. Whether the record and
beneficial ownership of the stock were identical did not appear.' But
even if a single stockholder, or a few stockholders, bore the entire legal
charge, the deduction therefor should not be disallowed merely because
other stockholders, although benefited thereby, did not choose to par-
ticipate in the litigation.
IV.
Capitalized Legal Expenses.
A long line of cases has upheld the well established Treasury regu-
lation'0 9 that the cost of defending or perfecting title to property is not
a deductible expense. Thus, attorneys' fees and other legal expenses
incurred either in connection with the original acquisition of property
or the subsequent defense of title thereto have been held to be a capital
expenditure, to be added to the cost of the property to which they relate,
recoverable over the life of the property, if it has fixed life, or to be
taken into account upon sale or other disposition." 0 This rule has been
applied to legal expenses incurred with respect to various types of prop-
erty, e.g., in defending title to a trade name,"' in acquiring stock
previously issued by the corporate taxpayer,"' in settlement of a suit
attacking title to a business,' a in perfecting the transfer of a stock ex-
108. Flemmon E. Gloyd, 19 B.T.A. 966 (1930).
109. Reg. 103, §§ 19.24-2: "The cost of defending or perfecting title to property con-
stitutes a part of the cost of the property and is not a deductible expense."
110. Farmer v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) (attorneys' fees
paid in successfully resisting suit attacking taxpayers' rights to property) ; Owens v. Commis-
sioner, 125 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942), cert. denied, 62 S. Ct. 1308 (1942) (amounts
paid in settlement of litigation relating to taxpayer's acquisition of interest in oil and gas
lands); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), aff'd on other issues,
287 U. S. 299 (1932) (attorneys' fees and costs of litigation in defending title) ; Williams
v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 357 (App. D. C., 1932) (attorneys' fees in prosecution of claims for
awards for condemnation of land); See also Ada B. Storm, B.T.A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 104,
675, June 17, 1942); W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932) (amount paid
for legal services incident to erection of building); Phoenix Development Co., 13 B.T.A.
414 (1928) (legal expense incurred in defending title to property); North American Oil
Consolidated, 12 B.T.A. 68 (1928) (amounts paid to attorneys for defending title to property
and securing land patents); Saletha A. Thompson, 9 B.T.A. 1342 (1928) (amounts paid for
legal opinions upon titles) ; Frederick McLean Bugher, 9 B.T.A. 1155 (1928) (amounts paid
for attorneys' fees, to the extent that they represented expenditures made to acquire an in-
terest in a mine, to enlarge an interest or to defend title thereto).
111. L. J. Skaggs, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkts. 107,466-7, May 4, 1942.
112. Evans-Winter-Hebb, Inc., B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 106,780, July 21, 1942.
113. Chestnut Farms Dairy, Inc., 19 B.T.A. 192 (1930).
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change membership," 4 in defending a right to receive oil royalties," 5
and acquiring other types of property and rights to property, in all of
which the attorneys' fees were held to be capital expenditures.
In this virtually impregnable stronghold of authority, an apparent
breach occurred which has only recently been filled. The point may be
of interest as a phase in the development of the law. In Abel Bliss"' the
litigation under review arose eleven years after the property was ac-
quired, and related to the right of a party to enter upon certain lands
and claim the oil and gas produced therefrom. The question was the
deductibility of legal expenses incurred in the litigation. Up to the
time of this decision, no distinction had been made as to whether such
expenses were incurred prior or subsequent to the acquisition of the
property; in either event, they had been held to be capital expenditures.
The Board followed the established rule and disallowed the expenses
as deductions. The Circuit Court, however, saw a distinction between
legal expenses incurred in acquiring property, and such expenses incurred
in protecting the owner's right to undisturbed possession and enjoyment
thereof. As the litigation related to the latter, the Circuit Court reversed
the Board and allowed the expenses as a deduction. This amounted to
setting up one rule on offense and another on defense. Thereafter, an-
other case came before the Board" 7 in which the question was the allow-
ance of attorneys' fees in a suit to remove a cloud on title arising out
of a fraudulent deed recorded some years after taxpayer's testator ac-
quired the property. The case seemed to be directly in the line of the
Bliss case, but the Board declined to follow the Circuit Court and held
that the attorneys' fees constituted capital expense. Member Mellott,
apparently impressed with the new theory, in a dissenting opinion made
a distinction between expense of litigation conducted as a sword of
offense, to add to one's capital, and that conducted as a shield of defense,
to protect one's property from those who would deprive the owner of
income. The theory collapsed, however, when the case reached the
Circuit Court,"' which, in upholding the Board, stated that to the ex-
tent that the Bliss case was in conflict, it was overruled. There is no
longer any question of modification of the original principle.
114. Albert E. Schwabacher, 43 B.T.A. 1177 (1941).
115. Moynier v. Welch, 97 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
116. Bliss v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), aff'g 20 B.T.A. 35
(1930).
117. Morgan Jones Estate, 43 B.T.A. 691 (1941).
118. Jones Estate v. Commissioner, 127 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
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V.
Legal Expenses in Corporate Matters.
It is not feasible, within the limitations of this paper, to discuss all
of the many types of legal expense which a corporation may incur. How-
ever, one class of expense which may be discussed without reference to
those cases "of little aid since each turns on its own special facts",119
is that relating to strictly corporate, as distinguished from business,
affairs of a corporation.
So obvious is the proposition that an individual may not deduct as
an expense attorneys' fees for services rendered in organizing a corpo-
ration that one wonders at the temerity of a taxpayer even to raise
the point.120 Equally well settled is the rule that a corporation may
not deduct, in the year in which incurred, legal expenses incident to
incorporation,'12 to an increase in authorized capital stock,'122 to a mer-
ger,'2 or to a recapitalization."
In an early case, 25 the Board suggested that, since organization ex-
penses are not represented by any saleable asset, it might be good
accounting to write them off over a brief period of years, but carefully
added the observation that "the income-tax laws are not always in
accord with accounting practice".
In the first case to come before it involving the question of the right
of a corporation having a limited period of existence to amortize expense
of organization over the life of its charter, 26 the Board, reasoning from
a previous case, 27 in which it had held that amounts paid for services
in selling stock could not be "amortized over the maximum life of the
119. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939).
120. Clara B. Parker, 30 B.T.A. 1231 (1934), app. dism. 75 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935).
121. Morganite Brush Company, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 776 (1931).
122. Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928) ; Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co.,
3 B.T.A. 932 (1926).
123. Motion Picture Capital Corporation v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936); First National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B.T.A. 807 (1926). But upon abandonment of
merger plans, the expense has been allowed as a deduction. Doernbecher Manufacturing Co.,
30 B.T.A. 973 (1934), A. XIII-2 C.B. 6, aff'd on another issue, 95 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938); see also Portland Furniture Manufacturing Co., 30 B.T.A. 878 (1934), N.A. XIII-2
C.B. 33 (1934).
124. Skenandoa Rayon Corporation v. Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
125. First National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B.T.A, 807, 808-809 (1920).
126. Hershey Manufacturing Company, 14 B.T.A. 867 (1928).
127. Corning Glass Works, 9 B.T.A. 771 (1927).
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stock", disallowed the deduction. The Circuit Court, however, reversed
the Board, holding that the corporate franchise was a capital asset used
in the business, and, as such, properly amortizable. 2
On the next occasion when this question arose, the Board specifically
declined to follow the Circuit Court, and adhering to its earlier reason-
ing held that the corporation was entitled neither to deduct nor to
amortize such expenses.129 The Circuit Court affirmed, but rested its
decision solely upon the insufficiency of the record, and took occasion
to state that, just as in the prior case the taxpayer was permitted to
amortize "expenses of incorporation, such as attorneys' and charter
fees", so, if the record had disclosed the amount, "it would seem that
petitioner would be entitled to a deduction for expenses of incorpo-
~130ration".
Although attorneys' fees and legal expenses in relation to a corpora-
tion's charter are not deductible as expenses, and are not amortizable
except in the comparatively rare instances in which corporations have
other than perpetual charters, they are deductible as losses in the taxable
year in which, by dissolution or forfeiture, the corporate charter is
surrendered.' 3 ' This development in the law was attained not without
considerable conflict of opinion. In a Division decision, 1 2 the Board
allowed as a loss in the year of dissolution the organization expenses in-
curred by a corporate taxpayer in a prior year. The Bureau non-
acquiesced. When, in another case, the point came before the full Board
for the first time,' it adopted the rule established in the earlier case
and allowed the loss, but there were two vigorous dissenting opinions,
in one of which Member Sternhagen expressed the view that there was
"no substance in the idea that a corporation suffers a loss of the cost of its
corporate existence when it dissolves. Its organization costs are incurred be-
cause it desires to exist. It gets what it desires for as long as it wishes and
then voluntarily quits. Thereby it loses nothing. To the contrary, it has
enjoyed everything which the expenditure contemplated."
Shortly prior to the date of this decision, the Bureau had withdrawn
128. Hershey Mfg. Company v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930).
129. Surety Finance Company of Tacoma, 27 B.T.A. 616 (1933).
130. Surety Finance Company of Tacoma v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).
131. This statement is not inconsistent with the statement that "attorneys' fees are not
deductible as losses" (p. 9 supra) since the subject matter of the loss is not the attorneys'
fees but the capital item in the acquisition of which the fees were incurred.
132. Malta Temple Association, 16 B.T.A. 409 (1929), N.A. VII-2 C.B. 67 (1929), A.
XIII-2 C.B. 12 (1934).
133. Pacific Coast Biscuit Company, 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), A. XIV-1 C.B. 15 (1935).
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its nonacquiescence in the earlier case, and in due course it acquiesced
in the later decision as well. 134
The Bureau and the Board, however, are still out of tune on the
question of the application of the rule. Under Delaware law, 3 ' a dis-
solved corporation continues as a body corporate for the purpose of
liquidating "for the term of three years from . . . dissolution". In one
case,' 36 the Bureau apparently took the position that 6rganization ex-
penses were deductible by a Delaware corporation only on expiration
of such three-year period. The Board held otherwise, and allowed the
deduction as a loss in the year of dissolution. It is difficult to under-
stand the reason for the Bureau's nonacquiescence. When the right to
do business comes to an end the object for which the charter was ob-
tained ceases, and it would seem that the identifiable event which fixes
the loss occurs at that time. Under the New York law,- 7 the period of
existence of a dissolved corporation for the purpose of liquidating its
affairs is unlimited, unless the directors voluntarily exercise their right
to take steps, three years after dissolution, to terminate it. In such a
case, it would seem clear that since the optional procedure to terminate
corporate existence may never be adopted, the only appropriate time
for recognition of a loss is the date of filing of the certificate of
dissolution.
All efforts to vary the established Board rule deferring deduction of
organization expenses until the year of dissolution have failed. Legal
expenses paid in connection with incorporation are not deductible in
the year of retirement of stock,138 in the year of a merger, 39 or in the
year in which a corporation ceases to do business and commences liqui-
dation but does not actually dissolve. 4 °
The theory underlying the decisions holding that legal expenses in-
curred in relation to the charter of a corporation are deductible in the
year of dissolution applies to legal expenses incident to any subsequent
changes in the corporate charter.' 4 ' Legal expenses incurred in connec-
tion with a corporation's dissolution have been held deductible as
134. But see Motion Picture Capital Corporation v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 872, 873
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), in which the language of the court indicates a point of view similar
to that of Member Sternhagen.
135. DEL. REv. CoDE (1935), C. 65, § 2074.
136. The Liquidating Company, 33 B.T.A. 1173 (1936), N.A. XV-2 C.B. 39 (1936).
137. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW (1941), § 105.
138. See The Brown Fence & Wire Company, 46 B.T.A. 344 (1942).
139. Citizens Trust Company, 20 B.T.A. 392 (1930).
140. City & Suburban Mortgage Company, 26 B.T.A. 179 (1932).
141. Pacific Coast Biscuit Company, 32 B.T.A. 39, 41 (1935), A. 1937-1 C.B. 19.
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ordinary and necessary expenses. 142 It would seem that legal expenses
incurred in qualifying a corporation to do business in a jurisdiction
other than that of its domicile should be accounted for as are legal
expenses in connection with its corporate charter.'43 Such expenses
should, however, be allowed in the year in which the corporation with-
draws from such other jurisdiction, and the' legal expense of withdrawal
should be deductible under Sec. 23 (a) in the year in which incurred.
Unlike expenses in relation to the corporate charter which, although
not deductible as expenses in the year incurred, are nevertheless allow-
able as losses in the year of dissolution, legal expenses incurred upon
the issuance of stock for cash are not deductible in any form at any
time. 4 4 It is, however, well recognized that attorneys' fees incident to
the procuring of temporary capital through the flotation of bonds may
be written off over the life of the indebtedness. 145
Legal expenses incurred upon issuance of stock in exchange for assets
should be capitalized and treated as a part of the cost of the assets,
recoverable, except in the case of a wasting asset, only upon disposi-
tion.' "46 In at least one case, the Board has held that legal expenses
incurred in connection with the organization of a corporation and the
authorization and issuance of stock, should be thus capitalized, and
treated as part of the cost of the assets acquired. 47 Generally speaking,
however, it would seem reasonably clear that legal expenses in connec-
tion with mergers, reorganizations and reclassifications, insofar as they
relate to the corporate charter, are deductible only in the year of dis-
solution. It is more doubtful whether legal expenses such as those
relating to issuance of rights and stock dividends and issuance of stock
in exchange for other stock of the issuing corporation would be de-
ductible on dissolution, as the latter group is more closely analogous
to legal expenses upon the-issuance of stock for cash.
142. Pacific Coast Biscuit, 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), N.A. XIV-1 C.B. 35 (1935) and 1937-1
C.B. 45; E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), A. 1941-1 C.B. 7.
143. But see United Carbon Co., 32 B.T.A. 1000 (1935), in which amounts paid to
foreign states in the year of qualification were allowed as deductions. It is not clear
whether the amounts were paid in connection with original qualification, or for the annual
privilege of doing business, and, if the former, whether deductible as taxes.
144. See Pacific Coast Biscuit Company, 32 B.T.A. 39, 41, 42 (1935); The Liquidating
Company, 33 B.T.A. 1173 (1936).
145. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932); Emerson Electric Manu-
facturing Co., 3 B.T.A. 932 (1920).,
146. Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co., 27 B.T.A. 642 (1933).
147. Ibid.
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V1.
Legal Expenses of Individuals, Estates and Trusts.
Like that of corporations, the field of legal expenses of individuals,
estates and trusts is so broad that it is not possible in a limited space
to do more than select a few situations for discussion. Of particular
interest at the moment is the recently enacted legislation designed to
benefit taxpayers not engaged in trade or business. By Sections
23(a) (1) (A) and 23 (a) (2), respectively, individuals engaged in busi-
ness and those not so engaged, have, as far as practicable, been placed
on an equal footing in the matter of the allowance of expense deduc-
tions. There remains one minor discrimination against the nonbusiness
taxpayer in that by a curious inconsistency, a business expense claimed
under Sec. 23 (a) (1) (A) is deductible only to the extent that it is not
allocable to wholly tax-exempt income, excluding wholly tax-exempt
interest, while a nonbusiness expense claimed under Sec. 23(a) (2) is
deductible only to the extent that it is not allocable to wholly tax-exempt
income including wholly tax-exempt interest.148
Not wholly unfamiliar is the phrase of the amended statute:
"for the production or collection of income, or for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income."
In 1934, long prior to the du Pont decision, the Internal Revenue Bu-
reau had accepted the principle that ordinary and necessary expenses
were allowable as deductions in connection with a trade or business if
paid or incurred during the taxable year "in the production of taxable
income", and extended it to such expenses with respect to
"the management, protection, and conservation of properties pro-
ducing taxable income". 49
That the Congressional intent was not merely to restore the status
148. See Report of Senate Committee on Finance on Revenue Bill of 1934, 1939-1 C.B.
586, 606, wherein the conclusion was stated that to disallow expenses incurred in earning
tax-exempt interest "might seriously interfere with the sale of Federal and State securities,
which would be unfortunate during the present emergency. Accordingly, your committee
recommends that the disallowance be applied to all classes of tax-exempt income except
interest. Thus, a bank or other financial institution will not be denied a deduction for
expenses incurred in earning tax-exempt interest."
Possibly, practical considerations underlie the distinction drawn in the Revenue Act of
1942 between taxpayers receiving tax-exempt interest who are in business and those not
in business.
149. I. T. 2751, XIII-1 C.B. 43 (1934).
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quo ante the du Pont decision is indicated by the Report of the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means wherein it was pointed out that the necessity
for the amendment was due "partly to the inadequacy of the statute
and partly to court decisions". 5 ' Moreover, there is ample evidence
that Congress contemplated a liberal construction, since both the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance reported
with respect to the amendment as follows:
"The term 'income' for this purpose comprehends not merely income of the
taxable year but also income which the taxpayer has realized in a prior taxable
year or may realize in subsequent taxable years, and is not confined to recur-
ring income but applies as well to gain from the disposition of property.
Expenses incurred in managing or conserving property held for investment may
be deductible under this provision even though there is no likelihood that the
property will be sold at a profit or will otherwise be productive of income". 151
To this the Senate Committee appended the further phrase:
"and even though the property is held merely to minimize a loss
with respect thereto."
Add to this evidence of a broad interpretation the further circumstance
that it was the Treasury Department which recommended an amend-
ment to the law, and it is reasonable to anticipate that the Internal
Revenue Bureau will not be unduly rigid in its application of the provi-
sion. 'This is not to say that the amendment is not without its limita-
tions. Both Committee Reports have expressly stated that expenses of
carrying on a transaction "primarily as a sport, hobby, or recreation
are not allowable as nontrade or nonbusiness expenses". 52 Moreover,
the law still states that no deduction shall be allowed "in respect of-
(1) Personal, living, or family expenses". 1t  Treasury Regulations'1 4
have long furnished illustrations of personal expenses. Among such are:
"Amounts paid as damages for breach of promise to marry, attorneys' fees
and other costs of suit to recover such damages, attorneys' fees paid in a suit
for separation, alimony, and an allowance paid under a separation agree-
ment ..
Doubtless, these provisions will be revised in due course, for, as certain
alimony and separate maintenance payments now constitute taxable
150. I. R. B. 1942, No. 43, p. 55.
151. I. R. B. 1942, No. 43, p. 75; I. R. B. 1942, No. 44, p. 84.
152. Ibid.
153. INT. REV. CODE, § 24 (a) (1).
154. Reg. 103, § 19.24-1 and prior regulations.
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income to a divorced or legally separated wife, 5 5 attorneys' fees and
other costs of a suit brought by a wife to obtain or collect such alimony
or separate maintenance payments qualify as expenses incurred in the
production or collection of income, and are, therefore, deductible.
It has been said that to distinguish between expenses in carrying on
a business and expenses in purely personal affairs is a difficult problem,
and that "the point where one class of expenses merges into another is
often hard to determine". 5 ' It will perhaps be even a greater problem
to determine where nondeductible personal expenses end and deductible
nonbusiness expenses begin.
Legal expenses in relation to income taxes illustrate the point. In
cases relating to taxpayers not engaged in business, it has been held
that the expense of preparation of income tax returns is a nondeductible
personal expense, 57 that legal expenses incurred in resisting a Federal
income tax deficiency based upon the disallowance of a charitable con-
tribution are nondeductible personal expenses,' and that legal fees
expended in State income tax litigation involving the taxability of gain
from the disposition of stock are also nondeductible. 5 9 On the other
hand, it has also been held that a taxpayer whose investment activities
were sufficiently extensive to qualify as a business under the Stone Tracy
definition was entitled to a deduction for attorneys' fees in connection
with a suit to recover income taxes. 60 In another case, a taxpayer who
brought a suit to recover estate taxes paid by an estate of which he was
a beneficiary, and expended legal fees in prosecuting the same, claimed
a deduction for such expenses.' 6 ' In disallowing the deduction, the
Court took occasion to state:
"If we were to agree with the argument of the petitioner's counsel that
the real test of deductibility is whether the expense was an ordinary and
necessary one in obtaining income we would take what might be supported as
a fair one."
From the foregoing, it would appear that legal expenses in relation
to the preparation of an income tax return would not be allowable under
Sec. 23(a) (2). If legal expenses are incurred in an income tax con-
troversy, it remains to be determined whether the question of deducti-
155. Revenue Act of 1942, § 120, amending INT. REV. CODE, § 22.
156. Monell v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
157. I.T. 2819, XIIH-2 C.B. 129 (1934).
158. G.C.M. 263, V-2 C.B. 162 (1926).
159. Louis Kuhn, 22 B.T.A. 975 (1931).
160. Kales v. Commissioner, 101 F. (2d) 35 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939).
161. MoneU v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934).
1943]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
bility will turn upon the nature of the item which gives rise to the con-
troversy. But the last quoted statement would tend to support the view
that such expenses would qualify as deductions under Sec. 23(a) (2).
Therefore, in weighing the effect of decisions dealing with deductions
by individuals under Sec. 23(a), one should always consider whether
or not they antedate the du Pont case, and, if decided on the basis of
the Stone Tracy definition, also have in mind the more liberal provision
of the Revenue Act of 1942, which relates the expense to property held
for the production of income, rather than, as did many of the earlier
cases, to income-producing property.
To be understood and applied, the cases relating to legal expenses as
business deductions, of estates and trusts, just as those relating to
deduction by individuals, must be evaluated by determining whether
they rested on the Stone Tracy or the du Pont definition of "business".
For years, the Board and the courts had held to the theory that the
preservation of a trust, or an estate after the normal period of adminis-
tration, itself constituted the doing of business. While legal expenses
paid by executors of an estate in process of administration in defending
a suit for an additional Federal estate tax had been classified as "in the
nature of'pure adrhinistration expenses" and, therefore, nondeductible,'162
other decisions held that similar legal fees, when paid by trustees for
services in prosecuting a claim for the refund of Federal estate taxes
constituted allowable deductions.'u Attorneys' fees paid by the execu-
tors of an estate the administration of which extended over a long
period were likewise ruled deductible because the services were recog-
nized as "performed in connection with the preservation and management
of the estate."'11 4 These cases and their underlying theories and distinc-
tions were thoroughly blasted by the du Pont and related decisions.
This point apparently was not clear to the Court of Claims when it
allowed certain legal expenses as a business deduction to a trust. 65
After reciting the Stone Tracy definition of "business", and paying lip
service to the du Pont decision, the Court proceeded to the conclusion
that the estate in question was "engaged in business, in the business of
conserving the estate and protecting its income". The Supreme Court,
162. James C. Ayer, 26 B.T.A. 9, 12 (1932), petition to review dismissed, 63 F. (2d)
231 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied 289 U. S. 752 (1933).
163. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 18 B.T.A. 395 (1930), N.A. IX-2 C.B. 70; Florence
Grandin, 16 B.T.A. 515 (1929), N.A. VIII-2 C.B. 63 (1929).
164. George W. Seligman, 10 B.T.A. 840, 844 (1928); H. Alfred Hansen, Extr., 6 B.T.A.
860 (1927).
165. Pyne v. U. S., 35 F. Supp. 81 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
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however, did not fail to note the inconsistency of this statement with
its own narrow interpretation, and held that the Stone Tracy definition
could not "be accepted as a guide". 6
Notwithstanding the limited scope of the term "business" as now
judicially determined for the purposes of Sec. 23(a) (1), it is still pos-
sible for an estate or trust under extraordinary circumstances to meet
the test and obtain a deduction for legal expenses incurred in business.
For example, where the executor of a large estate who had broad dis-
cretionary power was authorized by the decedent to continue his busi-
ness, the Court held that the estate was in business, and, consequently,
that certain legal expenses arising out of actions brought by the execu-
tor to retain control of the estate as a going concern were deductible.'67
The singular facts in this case, however,, limit its value as a precedent.
It may reasonably be predicted that the number of estates and trusts
which henceforth will be allowed legal expenses as business deductions
will be quite limited.
Before referring to the advantages accorded to an estate or trust by
Sec. 23(a) (2), a word should be said with respect to its limitations.
Legal or other expenses in the nature of capital expenditures can no
more fulfill the requirements of Sec. 23 (a) (2) than of Sec. 23 (a) (1) (A).
Nor do those which have no proximate relationship to income or prop-
erty held for its production qualify as deductions under Sec. 23(a) (2).
Thus, legal expenses incurred by trustees for the maintenance and
operation of an extensive summer residence, 'the use of which was de-
vised to beneficiaries, have been treated as having no relationship to
any business. 6 ' In this instance, the Board rejected a contention that
the expenses "were ordinarily and necessarily incurred for the preserva-
tion of the property", which, the Board said, was being retained for an
indefinite time "not for purposes of lease or sale nor for any other pur-
pose connected with a pecuniary benefit of the trust". In such a situa-
tion, Sec. 23(a) (2) would seem to afford no relief.
It must also be recorded that certain administration expenses are
deductible only if the benefit of an estate tax deduction with respect
thereto is relinquished, while, other administration expenses are non-
deductible in any event. Section 162 (e) of the Code, as amended by
Sec. 161 of the Revenue Act of 1942, provides that no deduction which
is allowable for estate tax purposes is allowable under Sec. 23(a) (2) in
computing the net income of an estate unless there is filed with the
166. U. S. v. Pyne, 313 U. S. 127 (1941).
167. Helvering v. Highland, 124 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
168. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 40 B.T.A. 165 (1939).
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Bureau a statement to the effect that the item involved was not claimed
or allowed as an estate tax deduction, together with a waiver of the
right to have the item allowed. The genesis of this provision is to be
found in recent Circuit Court decisions in which legal expenses in rela-
tion to business activities of an estate were allowed as income deduc-
tions, despite the fact that in computing the Federal estate tax the
same expenses had already been allowed as deductions from the gross
estate," 9 and in which such legal expenses were allowed as deductions
from the gross estate in computing the Federal estate tax, although the
same expenses had already been claimed as income deductions."'
The Committee on Ways and Means explained the provision which
ultimately was adopted as Sec. 161 of the Revenue Act of 1942, as
follows:
"Expenses incurred by an administrator or executor in the administration
of the estate of a decedent, such, for example, as expenses in securing the
processes and orders of the court having jurisdiction over the probate of an
estate, or in adjusting claims against the estate, or in distributing the remaining
assets to the beneficiaries, are not deductible under this section. Ordinary and
necessary expenses, however, which are paid or incurred during the taxable
year by an administrator or an executor for the production or collection of
income which must be reported by the estate for income tax purposes, may be
claimed as deductions under this section notwithstanding that deductions there-
for are allowable under section 812(b) in computing the gross estate subject
to the estate tax. Accordingly, subsection (c) of this section amends section
162 to provide that no deduction shall be allowed under section 23(a) (2) in
computing the net income of the estate for amounts for which there may have
been or has already been allowed a deduction under section 812(b) in com-
puting the net estate of the decedent"1 71
It will be no easy task to distinguish wholly nondeductible adminis-
tration expenses from administration expenses deductible because in-
curred either in the pursuit of income or in the conservation of property
held for that purpose. The first and last examples of the Committee
present no problem. The other illustration-expenses incurred in ad-
justing claims against the estate-is not so clear. Attorneys' fees in
prosecuting an appeal relating to a decedent's liability under a lease
have recently been held to be nondeductible as a business expense, be-
169. Helvering v. Highland, 124 F. (2d) 556 (C.C.A. 4th, 1942), aff'g Estate of Virgil
L. Highland, 43 B.T.A. 598 (1941), and citing with approval Robert J. Kleberg, et al., Extrs.,
31 B.T.A. 95 (1934).
170. Adams v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 578 (C.C.A. 9th, 1940).
171. I.R.B. 1942, No. 43, p. 75.
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cause "incurred in mere passive conservation of assets"." 2 It is not
difficult to foresee other instances of -litigated claims against an estate
adjusted only after the incurring of legal expenses which would thereby
affect "the conservation . . . of property held for the production of
income", in which event it would seem that the legal expenses would
meet the !'proximate relationship" test and should be allowed.: 3
To illustrate the type of legal expenses of estates and trusts which
are apparently encompassed by Sec. 23(a)(2), one may refer to old
Board decisions antedating the du Pont case, in which legal fees for
services rendered to an estate were allowed when "performed in con-
nection with the preservation and management of the estate"," 4 and in
which legal expenses of a trust which sought a Federal estate tax refund
were allowed as incurred in the performance of the duty of the trustees
"to preserve and protect the trust property". 175
A long-standing Bureau ruling" 6 held that expenses incurred by a
committee for an incompetent
"with respect to the management or conservation of income-producing property
or funds belonging to the incompetent or with respect to the collection or
securing of any income inuring to such incompetent"
were deductible, and although this ruling was outmoded by the du Pont
case the same result would now be achieved under Sec. 23(a) (2).
The newly enacted provision will also afford relief in guardianship
matters. In a decision rendered in 1931, the Second Circuit held that
attorneys' fees paid by a guardian in establishing his ward's right
to the net income from a trust estate were deductible business ex-
penses.' 7 But in a similar case, the Fifth Circuit later reached an
opposite conclusion." 8 In view of the conflict, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the later decision" 9 on the ground that
it was the ward who was the taxpayer, and that the ward was not in
business. If these cases were to arise under existing law, there is little
doubt that the attorneys' fees would be allowed as expenses incurred
for the production of income.
172. Stark Est., 45 B.T.A. 882 (1941).
173. See Monell v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 631, 632 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), and dis-
cussion at p. 41 supra.
174. George W. Seligman, 10 B.T.A. 840, 844 (1928).
175. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 18 B.T.A. 395 (1929); Florence Grandin, 16 B.T.A. 515
(1929).
176. I.T. 2238, IV-2, C.B. 49 (1925).
177. Commissioner v. Wurts-Dundas, 54 F. (2d) 515 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931).
178. Commissioner v. Van Wart, 69 F. (2d) 299 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934).
179. Van Wart v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 112 (1935).
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It is thus evident that on the question of the deductibility of expense,
the body of law built up on the Stone Tracy definition is not without
value, and that in the determination of whether the necessary nexus
exists between the subject matter of the expense and the taxpayer's
income or property held for income, these cases will serve as useful
precedents.
In considering the effect of the amended statute upon the deductibility
of legal expense, mention should be made of the cases in which the
legal expenses were incurred by individuals in connection with their
conduct as fiduciaries. Such cases may be divided into three classes:
(a) those in which the taxpayer could show that he was doing business
even within the narrow definition of that term and would, therefore,
be entitled to expense deductions under Sec. 23(a) (1), (b) those in
which the taxpayer could make no such showing, but where the expenses
apparently would be deductible under Sec. 23(a) (2), and (c) those in
which the taxpayer could neither meet the du Pont definition nor, appar-
ently, the requirements of Sec. 23(a) (2).
Typical of the first group is the case. ° in which trustees purchased
an inadequately secured mortgage for a trust. On an accounting, bene-
ficiaries sought to surcharge the trustees and to deny them compensa-
tion. To avoid protracted litigation, the taxpayer (one of the trustees)
paid $10,000 in settlement, for which he sought a deduction either as a
loss or as a business expense. He was an attorney engaged in general
practice, and half of his income represented executor's and trustee's com-
missions. Upon a finding that his "regular business included serving
for pay as trustee and as an executor.', and without specifying whether
it was a loss or a business expense, the Board allowed the payment as
a deduction.
In the second group is the case' 8' of a taxpayer who paid attorneys'
fees in connection with a proceeding in which he was surcharged as a
trustee for improvident investments. The record showed that he was
entitled to commissions for acting as trustee, but that he did not carry
on any business. Hence, a deduction for his attorneys' fees was dis-
allowed. If this taxpayer's case were to arise under Sec. 23(a) (2) it
would seem that the deduction would be allowed.
Representative of the third group is a case182 in which a taxpayer had
incurred attorneys' fees to recover for the trust securities forming part
180. John Abbott, 38 B.T.A. 1290 (1938).
181. Stuart v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 368 (C.C.A. 1st, 1936), cert. denied 299 U. S.
575. For a case note criticizing this decision see (1936) 50 HAv. L. REv. 362.
182. Adelaide P. Waldo, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 100,559, March 20, 1942.
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of the corpus which she, as trustee, had improperly lent to another. It
was conceded that the taxpayer was neither entitled to nor received com-
pensation for acting as trustee. The Board disallowed the deduction of
the attorney's fees as a business expense. The decision, it would seem,
could not be otherwise if the case arose under the present law.
Finally, there is the group of cases in which beneficiaries of trusts
incur legal expense in proceedings against trustees. The well known case
of Marshall Field will serve as an illustration. As beneficiary of a large
trust set up by his grandfather, he incurred attorneys' fees of $1,000,000
in a successful effort to free the income of the trust estate from the
accumulation provisions of the trust. The Court disallowed a deduction
of the expense thus incurred, saying that:
"expenses of this sort must fall within those general costs of pro-
tecting one's property for which the statute makes no allowance."'1s3
It appears that Sec. 23 (a) (2) now provides for just such a contingency.
The foregoing are only a few of the many cases which might be cited
to illustrate the salutary effect of the newly enacted Sec. 23 (a) (2). By
it, Congress has recognized the inequity of taxing income without allow-
ing as a deduction necessary expenses incident thereto. The provision
recognizes realities. Much has been said of the necessity of plugging
loopholes created at the expense of the Government. At long last an
effort has been made to plug a loophole created at the expense of the
taxpayer. The job has been done remarkably well.
VII.
Importance of Proper Allocation.
One cannot review the cases on this subject without noting the number
in which the taxpayer failed either to adduce proof of the nature of
the legal services involved or, where they related to both business and
nonbusiness matters, to make a proper allocation. In most cases the
failure has been fatal to the deduction. Time and again the Board and
the courts, in dealing with claims for deduction of legal expense, have
been obliged to deny them for lack of a proper record. Throughout
the cases run such phrases as:
"If any part thereof could be so classified (as business expense) the burden
of allocation must be on the petitioner and not on the Board",'"
183. Commissioner v. Field, 42 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
184. Helen S. Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926).
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"No method has been suggested whereby we may make such an allocation.
Consequently, on this point we must affirm the Commissioner", 18 5
"The services should have been explained and itemized. (The petitioner's)
mere statement that these services were connected with his business is by itself
insufficient to support the claimed deduction", 8 6
"the record furnishes no basis for the apportionment ... we are again con-
fronted with the fact that there is nothing in the record to permit a proper
allocation", 8 7
"As stated by the Board of Tax Appeals, there is no basis for making such
allocation."'188
When an attorney renders legal services in several matters the fee for
which must be variously accounted for in his client's tax return, it would
seem preferable that he make a specific charge for the separate items,
or that he provide his client with a proper allocation of the entire amount.
Generally, the attorney's allocation will be accepted, although if chal-
lenged by the Commissioner, it may not, in the absence of supporting
evidence, be decisive. 8 9
To the rigidly enforced rule that taxpayers claiming deductions under
Sec. 23 (a) must make or provide a basis for an allocation as between
expenses relating to the ordinary conduct of business and other expenses,
one exception may be noted. Where the general counsel of a corporation
was paid a fee of $10,000 for a year's services which included services
in relation to the acquisition of certain property and in connection with
building operations to be undertaken under a lease, the Board, after
finding that at least half of the amount paid related to other services,
held that the fee should not be disallowed
"merely because there are included therein some services which, when standing
alone, might more properly be capitalized.... When we consider the necessity
for, and the recurring nature of, such expenses, as well as the impracticability,
if not impossibility, of segregating capital and expense items in such pay-
ments, we are unwilling to say that the petitioner is not entitled to the
deduction". 190
But this is too small a raft to carry more than a relatively few taxpayers,
185. Arthur Jordan, 12 B.T.A. 423, 425 (1928).
186. John J. Hoefle, B.T.A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 92,791, July 25, 1940.
187. Murphy Oil Co., 15 B.T.A. 1195, 1201-1202 (1929), aff'd on issue involving attorneys'
fees and other issues, Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17 (C.C.A. 9th, 1932), aff'd
on other issues, 287 U. S. 299 (1932).
188. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 26 (C.C.A. 9th, 1932).
189. Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co., 27 B.T.A. 642, 644 (1933).
190. Saks & Co., 20 B.T.A. 1151 (1930), N.A. X-1 C.B. 92 (1930).
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nor has its strength been increased by the Bureau's nonacquiescence.
As to taxpayers engaged in business, the Revenue Act of 1942 makes
no change which affects the deductibility of legal expenses, but in this
respect the steepness of the rates emphasizes the point that a client's
taxes may be increased or diminished, depending upon the care which
an attorney exercises not only in billing his client but in making and
maintaining adequate supporting records of the services rendered. As to
taxpayers not in business, the new Revenue Act makes the first provi-
sion whereby their legal expenses incurred in the pursuit of income or
in connection with property held for income may be deducted. This is
the group as to which there is likelihood of a diversity of legal services,
fees for only a part of which may be allowed. As to a client in this
category, it would seem that an attorney owes a special duty to furnish
a proper segregation of deductible expenses, so that his client may have
the benefit of the full measure of relief which Congress has provided,
and may not be faced, as was the taxpayer in the Murphy Oil case,
with a denial of all legal expenses because there was "nothing in the
record to permit a proper allocation".
